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Abstract: A large and growing literature to explain how state and local policies affect factor
markets, firm location and economic growth has developed in three distinct threads.  These
threads have variously emphasized how policy and natural amenities affect regional economic
growth or firm location; how variations in policy and natural amenities can lead to persistent
wage differentials across regions; and how regional variation in factor inputs, including public
capital, affects output.  In this article, we expand the modeling framework of Roback and
Gyourko and Tracy to integrate these threads into a single inquiry about how state and local
policies—including the provision public capital—affects factor markets and economic growth. 
Using the model as the basis for estimation, we find that state and local policies have a more
profound influence on the private capital-to-labor ratio in a region than on private output. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the growth of government—either in the form of
services or public capital—discourages private sector growth.2
State and Local Policy, Factor Markets and Regional Growth
1.  Introduction
State and local governments are an important source of economic policy in the United
States.  The extent to which these policies affect private factor markets determines the extent to
which state and local government influences employment, industry composition and economic
growth. Therefore, a large and growing economics literature has developed to explain how state
and local policies affect factor markets, firm location and economic growth.
To some extent, however, the literature has divided into three relatively distinct threads.
One thread of the literature examines how state and local policy and natural amenities affect
regional economic growth or firm location (e.g. Carlino and Mills 1985,  Bartik 1985 and 1988,
Carlton 1983, Papke 1991, and Gray 1997).  Another thread emphasizes how differences in state
and local policy and natural amenities can lead to persistent regional differentials in wage rates
(e.g. Roback 1982, Beeson and Eberts 1989, Gyourko and Tracy 1989, and Haughwout
forthcoming).  The third thread examines whether the United States has sufficient public capital
by examining how regional variation in factor inputs affects regional output (e.g. Aschauer 1989,
Munnell 1990, Holtz-Eakin 1994, Bartik 1996, Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter 1996, Morrison
and Schwartz 1996, Kelejian and Robinson 1997, Boarnet 1998, Button 1998, Fernald 1999, and
Puig-Junoy 2001).     
2  The model’s reduced form provides a theoretical foundation for much of the existing
literature relating state and local policy to variations in regional growth.
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In this article, we expand the modeling framework of Roback (1982) and Gyourko and
Tracy (1989) to draw together the three threads of previous inquiry into a single inquiry of how
state and local policy—including the provision of public capital—affects factor quantities and,
consequently, economic growth.  Econometric implementation of the model involves two steps. 
The first step is to estimate how state and local policy and natural amenities affect private capital
and labor in a state.  The second step is to estimate how private and public capital and labor
contribute to state economic growth, while allowing private capital and labor to respond
endogenously to the other variables in the model.
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Estimation of the model allows us to examine how state and local policies—including the
provision of public capital—affect private factor quantities and economic growth.  Our analysis
addresses an empirical avenue in the debate on whether public capital is under provided that was
first identified by Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996) and has remained largely unexplored. 
We find that state and local policies have a more profound influence on the private capital-to-
labor ratio in a region than on private output.  Furthermore, the evidence suggests that growth of
government— whether it be in terms of services or infrastructure—appears to discourage growth
of the private sector. 
2.  An Equilibrium Model of Factor Markets
A general equilibrium model of factor markets provides insight into the various types of
government influence.  We model activity in the land, labor and capital markets as arising from4
(1)
(2)
the interaction between workers and firms taking as given government activity and allowing for
differentials in unemployment between jurisdictions.  The representative individual seeks to
maximize utility in the jurisdictional choice, and when employed sells one unit of labor at the
market wage. The representative firm takes prices as given and seeks to maximize profits. By
assumption, the representative agent is free to move among jurisdictions, but must work,
consume and pay taxes in his chosen jurisdiction.
The representative individual's utility can be described as:
where q is the quantity of goods consumed by the representative individual, N is the quantity of
land consumed by the representative individual, L is quantity of labor supplied and equals unity
if the worker is employed and zero if the worker is unemployed, Aj is a vector of natural
amenities found in jurisdiction j, and Gj is a vector of state and local government services
provided in jurisdiction j and includes public capital. 
The representative individual's budget constraint is:
where P is the national price of good q, Jsj is the sales tax in jurisdiction j, nj is the rental rate for
land in jurisdiction j, Jnj is the land rental tax rate imposed by state and local governments in
jurisdiction j, wj is the wage rate in jurisdiction j, Jwj is the labor income tax rate imposed by state
and local governments in jurisdiction, I is nonlabor income, and Jij is the tax rate on nonlabor
income imposed by the government in jurisdiction j.     





Combining equations 1 and 2 with the unemployment rate for jurisdiction j yields an
expression for indirect utility:
For a representative individual, utility in jurisdiction j is a function of the after tax wage rate, the
unemployment rate (mj), after tax nonlabor income, the tax inclusive price of goods, the tax
inclusive rental rate on land, natural amenities and the provision of government services.  Our
inclusion of the unemployment rate in the indirect utility function represents a potentially
important departure from the approaches taken by Roback (1982), Gyourko and Tracy (1989). 
Its inclusion allows for Neumann and Topel’s (1991) finding that regional variation in
unemployment rates and wages can be persistent and explained in equilibrium.
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Labor mobility assures equal (constant) expected utility across jurisdictions in the long
run:
Production in each jurisdiction can be described as:
where Qj is the output of the good in jurisdiction j, Lj is the quantity of labor employed in




used for production in jurisdiction j and Rj is a vector of state and local regulation in jurisdiction
j.  Because all workers in the jurisdiction sell one unit of labor, Lj(1+mj) is the number of
residents in jurisdiction j.
Firms in jurisdiction j maximize profits as follows:
where rj is the rate of return on capital in jurisdiction j and Jrj is the tax rate on capital.
Combining equations (5) and (6) yields an indirect profit function for production in
jurisdiction j:
Profits in jurisdiction j are a function of the price of goods sold, wages (inclusive of taxes), the
rate of return on capital, the tax inclusive rental rate on land, natural amenities, state and local
government services, and state and local regulation.
Capital mobility assures that the after-tax rate of return is equalized across jurisdictions in
the long run.  Therefore, 
where r is the national rate of return on capital.  The quantities of capital used in each jurisdiction
will adjust until any regional variation in the before-tax rate of return to capital reflects only state




The free entry and exit of firms assures that economic profits are reduced to zero over the
long run:
Following Gyourko and Tracy (1989) each pair of equations (3) and (4) and (7) and (9)
can be solved for the tax inclusive rental price of land, nj(1+tnj).  Combining the resulting
expressions yields a reduced form equation for the long-run equilibrium wage rate in each
jurisdiction:
As shown in equation (10), equilibrium wages in a jurisdiction are a function of tax rates
on nonlabor income, wages, goods, and capital, national prices for output and capital, nonlabor
income, the jurisdiction's natural amenities, government services, government regulations, and
the unemployment rate. In long-run equilibrium, differences in wages represent compensating
differentials for differences in the right-hand-side variables, and equation (10) serves as the basis
for the empirical literature attempting to explain persistent variation in wages across regions.  As
shown, regional variation in land tax rates are capitalized into land values and do not affect
wages.  
Similarly, one can combine the four equations to yield a reduced-form equation for the
long-run equilibrium rental price of land:     
4  In this context, a well-behaved production function supports a technology set that is a
nonempty closed convex set with freely disposable inputs and outputs (for further discussion, see





As shown by equation (11), wage tax rates are capitalized into land values, even though regional
variation in property tax rates are not reflected in wages.  Because land is immobile, its price
reflects all the aspects of the jurisdiction, including policy.
Given these long-run equilibrium equations for factor prices and a well-behaved
production function (equation 5), we follow Haughwout (1998) to obtain reduced-form equations
for factor quantities.
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These three equations for factor quantities provide a basis for estimating the effects on factor
markets, and similar forms to equations (12) and (13) have been used in some of the empirical
literature on the effects of state and local policy on regional economic growth, but without formal
derivation and without the inclusion of public capital as a government service.
For each jurisdiction, labor, capital and land depend on the same set of variables: the
nationally determined prices for output and capital, nonlabor income, local amenities, the local
unemployment rate, and the full spectrum of state and local governmental policies.  One striking9
(15)
feature of the set of equilibrium conditions is the pervasive effect of government policies.  A
government's choices concerning tax rates have larger repercussions than merely the market in
which the tax is levied.  For example, although sales taxes are levied only on the consumption of
output, they can distort all dimensions of the factor markets except for the price of capital. 
Similarly, wage taxes influence not only the labor market but also the quantities of capital and
land used in production.
3.  Output
Substituting equations (12), (13) and (14) into the production function (5) yields a
reduced form relating state and local fiscal policy, the provision of public capital, natural
amenities, government regulation and other variables to output. 
Similar forms to equation (15) have been used in the empirical literature on the effects of state
and local policy on regional economic growth without formal derivation and without the
inclusion of public capital as a government service.  Some output models are made more
interesting by introducing related dynamics such as population growth (Carlino and Mills 1985)
or the development of innovative capacity (Riddel and Schwer, this volume).     
5  Some may regard the quantity of land as endogenous in an economic sense, but the
available data make it an exogenous variable that is time invariant and captured as state-level
fixed effects.
     
6  In a somewhat different approach, Pereira (2001) examines impulse responses obtained
from simulations of a vector autoregressive model with equations representing output, private
employment, private investment and various measures of public capital investment.  This
approach necessitates the omission of other measures of state and local policy.
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(16)
An alternative strategy is to estimate the production function as it is originally written,
while recognizing that the quantities of private capital and labor are endogenous and must be
instrumented.
5
The right-hand-side variables in equations (12) and (13) provide convenient instruments for labor
and private capital.  Similar forms to equation (16) have been used in the empirical literature on
whether the United States has sufficient public capital without instrumenting labor and private
capital and without the inclusion of state and local government services other than public
capital.
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4.  Empirical Analysis
Equations (12) and (13) provide a basis for estimating the effects of public capital, as well
as state and local expenditures and taxes on the private capital and labor in a state.  Equations
(15) and (16) provide two differing estimation strategies for determining how public capital and
state and local fiscal policy affect output.  We explore both approaches using a panel of state-
level data for the 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1977-1992.  First, we estimate equations (12),11
(13) and (15).  Second, we estimate equation (16) using the right-hand-side variables from
equations (12) and (13) as the instruments for private capital and labor.  We find that the growth
of government is not associated with faster growth of the private sector.  On the contrary, the
growth of government— whether it be services or infrastructure—appears to discourage growth
of the private sector. 
4.1  Data
Alicia Munnell’s data (Munnell 1990) are frequently used to examine productivity and
economic growth (e.g. Morrison and Schwartz 1996, Kelejian and Robinson 1997).  However,
her estimates of the private capital stock leave room for improvement.  Basically, Munnell
decomposes U.S. estimates of private capital into state-level estimates using information from
industry censuses to identify each state’s share of U.S. capital for that industry in census years. 
She then assumes that the state shares of private capital are constant for a multi-year period
centered on the census year.  “Data from the 1972 Census were used to apportion among the
states the BEA national stock estimates for 1969 to 1974; 1977 shares were used for the 1975 to
1979 stock estimates; 1982 shares were the basis for the estimates from 1980 to 1984 and 1987
data were used to apportion national asset totals for 1985 and 1986.” (Munnell 1990, pg. 97).  
Thus, the private capital stocks in each industry in a state are assumed to grow at the national rate
in most years.  Private capital stocks in each industry in a state are assumed to grow at rates
different than the national rate only during the one year intervals from 1974 to 1975, 1979 to
1980 and 1984 to 1985.12
Munnell’s apportionment strategy has unfortunate consequences for the temporal patterns
of growth of the private capital stocks in each state.  In 1975, 1980 and 1985, growth rates are
exaggerated in each industry to “catch up” for the five-year deviations in the state’s growth rate
from the national average.  In all other years, the cross-sectional variations in the growth of
private capital arise solely from changes in the industrial composition of the states.
We improve on Munnell’s data in three ways.  First, rather than assume that state capital
stocks grow at the national rate in most years, we use an interpolation strategy that is akin to the
Chow-Lin procedure.  Our interpolation strategy allows each industry’s capital stock to grow at a
state-specific ratio to the U.S. growth rate for that industry.  Second, we base our estimates on
improved measures of the U.S. capital stock that were not available to Munnell.  Finally, we
update Munnell’s series to cover the period 1967-92.  See the appendix for further details on the
construction of the private capital stock series.
We estimate net public capital stocks for each state by apportioning the BEA national
estimates for state and local government capital.  Following Munnell, we use annual data on
government capital outlays since 1958 to generate perpetual-inventory estimates of public capital
stocks for each state. We sum these estimates across the states and assign each state a share of the
national public capital stock according to its share of the sum-of-states estimate.  As in Munnell,
the analysis yields capital stock estimates for highways, sewers and water supply systems and
total state and local government capital.  
We differ from Munnell in a number of ways, however.  Most obviously, we have
extended the data set to cover the period 1967-1992.  We have also incorporated improved
estimates of national public capital stocks that were not available to Munnell.  Munnell followed13
the BEA by constructing net capital stocks presuming straight-line depreciation schedules and a
modified Winfrey S-3 retirement pattern.  More recently, however, the BEA has adopted a
strategy in which the annual geometric rate of depreciation is a function of the average service
life for each type of capital.  According to the BEA, the average service life for highways is 45
years, while the average service life for sewers and water supply systems is 60 years.  The
average service life for other types of state and local government capital ranges from seven years
for typewriters and calculating machines to 80 years for new single-family residences.  These
figures imply that the annual geometric rate of depreciation is a constant for highways and water
and sewer systems, and a function of the composition of net stocks for total public capital.  The
implicit annual depreciation rate for the national estimate of aggregate state and local public
capital has increased sharply since 1958, implying a large shift in composition over that period.  
Where Munnell assumed that the composition of public capital was stable through time, we
accommodate the shift toward assets with shorter service lives by using the implicit national
depreciation rate when calculating perpetual inventory estimates for the states.  See the appendix
for further details on the construction of the public capital stock series.
The remaining data in the panel come from a variety of sources.  Data on unemployment
rates, private real gross state product and private employment in each state come from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and the BEA.  Data on taxes and other characteristics of the state fiscal
environment come from the Census and Survey of Governments.  We construct proxies for
effective tax rates by dividing state and local government revenues from sales, property,
individual income, and corporate income by gross state product.  All other components of the
government budgets are also deflated by gross state product to facilitate a balanced-budget     
7  The omitted category is miscellaneous revenues and deficit spending.  All of the spending
variables are expressed net of user fees (see Taylor 1995).
     
8 For ease of exposition, we also multiply all of these variables by 100.
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interpretation. Those other components include net transfers from the federal government; net
revenues from utilities; and net expenditures on higher education, other education, health and
hospitals, welfare, and general government services.
7  Because crime is a potentially important
disamenity, we also include data on the total crime rate in each state from the FBI’s Statistics of
Crime.  State-level fixed effects capture omitted state characteristics while time fixed effects
capture national, business cycle variations.
For purposes of estimation, capital, labor and output are transformed into log first
differences, while the remaining variables—tax rates, spending rates, crime rates and
unemployment rates—are expressed as first differences.
8  To allow for diminishing returns to the
size of the public sector, we also include a measure of government size (direct operating
expenditures as a share of GSP in levels.)  Following Garcia-Milà et al. (1996), we lag all of the
independent variables one year so that they are at least nominally predetermined.  Because
consistent data on real gross state product are only available since 1977, our analysis covers the
period 1979-1992.
4.2 Reduced-Form Estimation
Our first approach is to estimate equations for capital (12), labor (13) and the reduced
form equation for output (15).  To improve the efficiency of estimates from a panel with a short
time series and many cross sections, we use the block-diagonal covariance structure suggested by     
9  We also adjust each equation for state-specific temporal autocorrelation using Cochrane-
Orcutt Iterative Least Squares to estimate the autocorrelation coefficient.  Estimated
autocorrelation coefficients range from -.48 to .93 for the employment equation, .37 to .95 for the
private capital equation, and -.72 to .80 for the gross product equation.  
     
10  We use the SAS CLUSTER procedure to cluster states into nine groups according to
industrial mix (see Appendix table A1).  Our measures of industrial mix are the shares of GSP in
each major industry group in the state—agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, retail
trade, wholesale trade, TCPU (transportation, communications and public utilities), services,
FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) and government.
     
11  The major exception is the estimated relationship between private employment and
highways or water and sewer capital, which is smaller when the states are clustered by census
region then it is when they are clustered by industrial composition.
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Gunther and Schmidt (1993). Because the Gunther-Schmidt approach allows for correlation
among the residuals for all states within a designated group, it can also capture some of the
spatial correlation among states.
9  We consider two grouping strategies—clustering the states
according to census region, and clustering the states according to industrial mix.
10  The
estimation is generally insensitive to the grouping strategy (see Tables 1a and b).
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For the most part, the increased provision of public capital does not appear to attract the
private factors of production.  None of the types of public capital are associated with rising
private employment.  Growth in water and sewer capital has a significantly negative relationship
with both private capital and labor.  
Government expenditures and taxation variables enter the estimation symmetrically with
a balanced-budget constraint.  Thus, the coefficient on a tax or revenue variable reflects the
effects of increasing that budget component while holding constant all other included budget
components.  This means that the revenue and expenditure variables are evaluated against a
change in the omitted variable. The selection of the omitted variable is key to interpreting the16
results.  If the omitted variable represents a particularly attractive source of revenue, the
coefficients on expenditures and most other revenue sources will be negative.
In the reported tables, the omitted variable is miscellaneous revenues and deficit
spending.  Thus, the property tax coefficient would be interpreted as the impact of a budgetary
shift toward property taxes and away from miscellaneous revenues and deficit spending. 
Similarly, the coefficient on the health and hospitals variable would be interpreted as an increase
in health expenditures financed by an increase in miscellaneous revenues.  If we wish to
determine the impact of increasing expenditures on health and hospitals financed by property
taxes, we simply add the coefficients together. 
In a balanced budget context, the analysis suggests that both capital and labor are most
attracted to states where the public sector is relatively small (the coefficient on government size
is significantly negative) and where spending growth is concentrated in general government
services rather than health, education or welfare.  Growth in educational spending appears
particularly unattractive; there is no budgetary reallocation to finance primary and secondary
education that is positively associated with growth in private employment or private capital. 
This contrarian result may arise from the explosion in educational expenditures during the
sample period and the well documented inefficiencies in translating educational spending into
educational services (e.g. Hanushek et al. 1996, Grosskopf et al. 2001).  Interestingly, private
capital strongly favors reallocating educational spending from primary education to higher
education while private employment appears indifferent between the two. However, there is no
other budgetary reallocation to finance higher education that is statistically significant and
positively associated with growth in private capital. 17
On the revenue side, labor strongly favors states with growing sales taxes over states with
growing property taxes.   In fact, rising property taxes are particularly unattractive to labor.  Any
budgetary reallocation that would cut property taxes is associated with faster growth in private
employment.  One possible explanation is that rising property tax revenues may reflect rising
property values and a generally rising cost of living, which would discourage in-migration.
On the other hand, capital appears generally indifferent to the revenue source.  Regardless
of the clustering strategy, the coefficient on the least preferred revenue source—individual
income taxes—is not significantly different from the coefficient on any other revenue source.
To some extent, the effects that public capital and state and local fiscal policy have on
private output are similar to those on labor.  The signs of the coefficients on public capital in the
output equation are the same as those on labor.  The effects of changes in the composition of
state and local government spending on the growth of private output are essentially the same as
those on labor growth.  In addition, an increase in property taxes is the least attractive way to
boost state and local government revenue from the perspective of private employment and output
growth.
Nonetheless, the effects of government policy on output are not just a weighted average
of the effects on private capital and labor. For example, changes in the sources of revenues seem
to have somewhat different effects on output than might be expected from the labor and output
equations.  A shift from sales taxes into income taxes is insignificant for both private labor
growth and private capital growth, but significantly positive from the perspective of private
output growth.  Given the theory implies that taxes influence output only to the extent that they18
influence factor allocations, the differing results on the revenue side suggest that state-to-state
differences in the composition of the private sector may be affecting the estimates.
4.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
Our second approach to estimating the effects of state and local policy on private output
is to estimate equation (16) using instrumental variables.  The effects of state and local policy on
private factors are captured in the auxiliary equations.  Therefore, the coefficients on state and
local capital and fiscal policy in the primary equation should reflect only direct productivity
effects, and not those operating indirectly through the factor markets.
We estimate equation (16) using the right-hand-side variables from equations (12) and
(13) as the instruments for private capital and labor.  Because the residuals from (12) and (13)
were correlated, we use three stage least squares.  The data were adjusted using the same
autocorrelation coefficients as in the reduced-form output equation.  Because we could not reject
the hypothesis that state fixed effects on output were jointly zero, they were not included in the
primary equation for output, although they are included in both of the auxiliary equations.
Table 2 compares the reduced-form estimates of the output equation (15) with the
estimates for the output equation obtained with three stage least squares (3SLS). The 3SLS
estimates show that an increase in private capital or labor increases private output.  Government
services are significant in the reduced-form estimation but insignificant in the 3SLS estimation,
suggesting that such services influence output growth primarily through their influence on factor
accumulation. 19
The previous literature suggests that increased provision of public capital is unlikely to
reduce gross state product directly (Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter, 1996), and indeed, we find
that increases in public highways and water and sewer capital have no effect on the growth of
private output beyond their effects on private capital and labor.  However, we also find that an
increase in other state and local public capital has a significantly negative effect on output
growth in addition to its negative on private labor and negligible effect on private capital. Taken
at face value, this finding would seem to imply that other state and local public capital has been
increased to the point of negative returns.
Coupled with the equations for private labor and capital, the 3SLS results suggest that
although the increased provision of public highways and water and sewer capital has no direct
effect on private output growth, it reduces private output by deterring labor in-migration and
private capital formation.  Increased provision of other state and local public capital directly
reduces output growth while it also discourages labor in-migration and has no apparent effect on
private capital formation.  In any case, however, we find the increased provision of public capital
reduces the growth of private output.
5.  Conclusions
Our analysis expands the modeling framework of Roback (1982) and Gyourko and Tracy
(1989) to integrate into one what have previously been three distinct threads in the literature. 
One thread examines how state and local policy and natural amenities affect economic growth. 
Another thread examines how differences in state and local policy and natural amenities can lead20
to persistent differentials in wages across regions.  A third thread examines whether the United
States has sufficient public capital.
We use the modeling framework to examine how state and local fiscal policy and the
provision of public capital affects the labor and private capital in a state and, consequently, its
economic growth.  Consistent with the previous literature, we find that some state and local
government expenditures more than offset the negative effects of the taxes used to finance them. 
Others do not. On net, the analysis suggests that private capital and labor grow most rapidly in
states with smaller public sectors.
We also find that the increased provision of public capital may discourage labor in-
migration.  According to the theoretical framework we employ, the discouraging effects on labor
in-migration arise through capital inflows bidding up property values and increasing the cost of
living.  We also find that some forms of state and local public capital have been increased to the
point that (for the average state) further increases reduce output.  The net effect is that the
increased provision of state and local public capital appears to reduce private gross state
product—although total output per capita may be higher.21
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Table 1a: Reduced-Form Estimation, Clustered by Industrial Mix








Intercept 14.5531 1.2368 11.77 6.1631 0.8829 6.98 4.4254 1.6791 2.64
Highway Capital -0.2041 0.0303 -6.74 -0.0301 0.0159 -1.89 -0.2175 0.0541 -4.02
Water & Sewer Capital -0.1016 0.0134 -7.60 -0.0206 0.0056 -3.68 -0.1346 0.0253 -5.33
Other S&L Capital -0.0843 0.0146 -5.77 0.0046 0.0104 0.45 -0.1629 0.0406 -4.01
Sales tax 0.2282 0.1815 1.26 0.1528 0.0882 1.73 -0.3567 0.3472 -1.03
Property tax -1.5245 0.1617 -9.43 0.0489 0.0597 0.82 -0.5085 0.2996 -1.70
Individual Income tax -0.0419 0.1542 -0.27 -0.0496 0.0571 -0.87 0.4933 0.3111 1.59
Corporate Income tax -0.1419 0.3498 -0.41 0.1912 0.1474 1.30 3.0888 0.6306 4.90
Net Intergovernmental Revenue  -0.0808 0.1243 -0.65 0.0369 0.0456 0.81 -0.3245 0.2599 -1.25
Net Revenue from Utilities 0.2379 0.1970 1.21 0.0885 0.1422 0.62 0.9147 0.5702 1.60
Higher Education Spending -0.7219 0.1501 -4.81 -0.1182 0.0663 -1.78 -1.5525 0.3482 -4.46
Elementary and Secondary Education -0.7421 0.1442 -5.15 -0.3910 0.0678 -5.77 -1.5535 0.3178 -4.89
Health and Hospitals -0.0579 0.2266 -0.26 -0.0735 0.0707 -1.04 -0.5040 0.4747 -1.06
Welfare -0.4168 0.1753 -2.38 -0.0677 0.0689 -0.98 -0.9938 0.3536 -2.81
General Government Services 0.3394 0.0808 4.20 0.0187 0.0352 0.53 0.3792 0.1953 1.94
Government Size -0.7975 0.0538 -14.82 -0.1535 0.0363 -4.23 -0.0610 0.0910 -0.67
Crime Rate -0.0003 0.0001 -2.30 -0.0002 0.0000 -3.98 -0.0004 0.0002 -1.82
Unemployment Rate -0.4273 0.0297 -14.39 -0.0256 0.0132 -1.95 -0.2477 0.0638 -3.88
Adjusted R-square  0.8616 0.6471 0.7100
Note:  All of the equations also include time and state fixed effects.24
Table 1b: Reduced-Form Estimation, Clustered by Census








Intercept 12.7701 1.2862 9.93 5.8778 0.8715 6.74 3.4394 1.7543 1.96
Highway Capital -0.1271 0.0382 -3.33 -0.0353 0.0180 -1.96 -0.1746 0.0554 -3.15
Water & Sewer Capital -0.0578 0.0138 -4.18 -0.0246 0.0062 -3.95 -0.0936 0.0223 -4.19
Other S&L Capital -0.0727 0.0186 -3.90 0.0102 0.0119 0.86 -0.1554 0.0371 -4.19
Sales tax 0.2402 0.2042 1.18 0.1677 0.0898 1.87 -0.2849 0.3315 -0.86
Property tax -1.4823 0.1755 -8.45 0.1337 0.0654 2.05 -0.4593 0.2828 -1.62
Individual Income tax 0.0742 0.1808 0.41 -0.0016 0.0688 -0.02 0.6585 0.3086 2.13
Corporate Income tax 0.0698 0.3850 0.18 0.0705 0.1619 0.44 3.4388 0.6393 5.38
Net Intergovernmental Revenue  -0.1260 0.1399 -0.90 0.0526 0.0521 1.01 -0.2769 0.2440 -1.13
Net Revenue from Utilities 0.2005 0.2520 0.80 0.0464 0.1414 0.33 0.3127 0.4545 0.69
Higher Education Spending -0.6495 0.1769 -3.67 -0.1403 0.0694 -2.02 -1.3395 0.3356 -3.99
Elementary and Secondary Education -0.6184 0.1610 -3.84 -0.4223 0.0684 -6.18 -1.6839 0.3096 -5.44
Health and Hospitals 0.1125 0.2570 0.44 -0.1655 0.0965 -1.71 -0.7380 0.5016 -1.47
Welfare -0.6460 0.2130 -3.03 -0.1000 0.0905 -1.10 -0.8748 0.3720 -2.35
General Government Services 0.2228 0.0966 2.31 0.0121 0.0375 0.32 0.2157 0.1961 1.10
Government Size -0.6959 0.0603 -11.55 -0.1663 0.0358 -4.65 0.0235 0.1040 0.23
Crime Rate -0.0003 0.0001 -2.15 -0.0003 0.0001 -4.93 -0.0005 0.0002 -2.32
Unemployment Rate -0.4292 0.0352 -12.20 -0.0181 0.0141 -1.29 -0.1992 0.0639 -3.12
Adjusted R-square  0.8592 0.6471 0.7070
Note:  All of the equations also include time and state fixed effects.25
Table 2: Policy and the Growth in Private Gross State Product 






Intercept 4.4254 1.6791 2.64 -1.5829 1.0430 -1.52
Private Capital 0.4574 0.1150 3.98
Private Employment 0.5117 0.1089 4.70
Highway Capital -0.2175 0.0541 -4.02 -0.0683 0.0865 -0.79
Water & Sewer Capital -0.1346 0.0253 -5.33 -0.0211 0.0403 -0.52
Other S&L Capital -0.1629 0.0406 -4.01 -0.1194 0.0585 -2.04
Sales tax -0.3567 0.3472 -1.03
Property tax -0.5085 0.2996 -1.70
Individual Income tax 0.4933 0.3111 1.59
Corporate Income tax 3.0888 0.6306 4.90
Net Intergovernmental Revenue  -0.3245 0.2599 -1.25
Net Revenue from Utilities 0.9147 0.5702 1.60
Higher Education  -1.5525 0.3482 -4.46 -0.9993 0.6901 -1.45
Elementary and Secondary
Education -1.5535 0.3178 -4.89 -0.8626 0.5694 -1.51
Health and Hospitals -0.5040 0.4747 -1.06 -0.8539 1.0612 -0.80
Welfare -0.9938 0.3536 -2.81 -0.2600 0.8002 -0.32
General Government Services  0.3792 0.1953 1.94 0.2636 0.3341 0.79
Government Size -0.0610 0.0910 -0.67 0.0327 0.0625 0.52
Crime Rate -0.0004 0.0002 -1.82 0.0003 0.0004 -0.73
Unemployment Rate -0.2477 0.0638 -3.88
Adjusted R-square  0.7100 0.5938
Note: Both of the equations include time fixed effects.  The reduced form equation also
includes state fixed effects.  The reduced-form estimation is clustered by industrial mix.26
7. Appendix
Our estimates of private capital stocks differ from Munnell’s in two key respects.  First,
we differ because we use revised estimates of Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth that were not
available to Munnell.  Second, we use a different interpolation strategy for non-census years.
In census years, we follow Munnell in apportioning the U.S. capital stock to the states
according to each state’s share of economic activity in that industry.  To interpolate the state-
level capital stocks in noncensus years, we calculate the rate of change between census years in
the U.S. capital stock and the apportioned state-level capital stock for each industry.  Let $s be
the ratio of those rates of change.
Assuming that state-level capital stocks grow at this state and industry-specific ratio to the U.S.
growth rate for that industry ($s) then the state-level capital stocks in non-census years would be
If $s were estimated rather than calculated, and assumed to be constant in all periods, then
our interpolation technique would be a version of the familiar Chow-Lin interpolation strategy. 
Because the series we are interpolating are short (only five censuses are available for some
industries) we chose not to use an estimation-based interpolation technique.
Unfortunately, the above technique generates implausibly volatile estimates of $s for
construction and agriculture.  Therefore, we use a different strategy for interpolating these capital
stocks.  We assume that for each intercensus period construction (agricultural) capital grows at a
state-specific constant rate (s 
We then calculate the sum of the state estimates in each period and calculate the ratio of that sum
to the national estimate.  All state-level estimates of the construction (agricultural) capital stock
are then deflated by this ratio so that in each year the sum of the state estimates equals the
national estimate.
Our estimates of net public capital stocks also differ from Munnell’s estimates in a
number of ways.  Most obviously, we have extended the data set to cover the period 1967-1992. 
We have also incorporated improved estimates of national public capital stocks that were not
available to Munnell.  Munnell followed the BEA by constructing net capital stocks presuming
straight-line depreciation schedules and a modified Winfrey S-3 retirement pattern.  More     
12See U.S. Department of Commerce (1999).
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recently, however, the BEA has adopted a geometric depreciation strategy.  To reflect the change
in BEA techniques, we calculate our perpetual-inventory estimates of net capital stocks in each
state for period t as
where t $ i, Ntj is the net capital stock of asset type j, Iij is investment in year i, and *j is the
annual geometric rate of depreciation for type of asset j.
12   In turn,
where Tj is the average service life for asset type j in years and Rj the declining balance rate for
asset type j.  According to the BEA, the average service life for highways is 45 years, while the
average service life for sewers and water supply systems is 60 years.  The average service life for
other types of state and local government capital ranges from seven years for typewriters and
calculating machines to 80 years for new single-family residences.  The declining balance rate
(Rj) is .91 for government structures and 1.65 for state and local government equipment. These
figures imply that the annual geometric rate of depreciation is 0.0202 for highways, 0.0152 for
water and sewer systems, and a function of the composition of net stocks for total public capital. 
We calculated the implicit annual depreciation rate for the national estimate of aggregate state
and local public capital, and use this implicit depreciation rate in our calculations.  Such an
approach accommodates the large shifts in the composition of aggregate state and local
government capital that were evident in the national data.28
Appendix Table A1
State Clusters According to Industry Mix
1 GA, IL, KS, MN, MO, NJ, OR
2 AL, AR, IN, KY, MI, MS, NC, OH, SC, WI
3 CA, CT, MA, NY, RI
4 AZ, CO, FL, MD, UT, VA
5 DE, ME, NH, PA, TN, VT, WA
6 LA, MT, NM, OK, TX, WV
7 ID, IA, NE, ND, SD
8 WY
9 NV